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The concentrated nature of the beef packing industry brings into concern the 
competitiveness of markets used to procure fed cattle.  Research examining the 
relationship between concentration and market competitiveness can be seen as 
encompassing three bodies.  Studies of the first type, pioneered in the 1950’s by Joe Bain, 
are commonly referred to as “Structure-Conduct-Performance” (SCP) studies.  These 
studies rely on theoretical models that suggest a relationship between the number of firms 
in an industry and industry prices and therefore profits.  With these theoretical models as 
motivation, this empirical research examines the relationship between industry profits 
and industry concentration.  While generally finding a positive relationship between 
concentration and profits, these studies are plagued by several shortcomings.  They suffer 
because the underlying mechanism or conduct assumed to create increased profits is not 
explicitly modeled.  Instead, the structure of an industry is seen to dictate the member 
firms’ conduct resulting in increased prices and profits.  Why and how firms behave is 
not modeled.  With the advent of game theoretic models, it has been pointed out that 
outcomes deviating from the competitive outcome are far from certain in even the most 
concentrated markets.  SCP studies also suffered from infrequently addressed technical 
econometric considerations, including simultaneous equation bias; i.e., industry 
concentration may be endogenous.  In contrast to SCP studies, “new empirical industrial 
organization” (NEIO) models explicitly modeled the behavior of firms.  In this research, 
structural equations derived from profit maximization conditions are estimated.  The goal 
of this research was to estimate a parameter, bounded by 1 and 0, suggesting the degree 
price deviated from marginal cost.  A value of zero indicated marginal cost pricing, while 
a value of 1 indicated monopoly pricing.  Parameters between zero and one indicate the 
percent price is greater than marginal cost, and indicate the degree of an industry’s 
competitiveness.  While explicitly showing a theoretical model generating estimable 
structural equations, these studies are of limited usefulness in that they again fail to 
identify how prices deviate from marginal cost.  Again, the mechanisms allowing firms to 
exercise market power are not considered.  A third body of research, based in game 
theory, models players (firms) as rational decision-makers with optimal strategies based 
on their own payoffs and other players’ payoffs and strategies.  These models allow 
players to recognize their interdependency and change their behavior according to other 
player’s available strategies and associated payoffs.  These models are unique in that they 
allow researchers to examine industry practices or institutional features that “facilitate”   2 
non-competitive outcomes.  By identifying how non-competitive outcomes are generated, 
these models have proven useful to government regulators whose goal is to insure the 
competitiveness of markets.  It is the goal of this paper to use this research as motivation 
to examine practices in the fed cattle market that may facilitate non-competitive market 




A useful place to start the discussion is to examine the well-known prisoner’s dilemma.  
This simple game has proven useful to examine the interaction and coordination of 
players in market situations.  In this game, there are two players and two possible 
strategies.  Each player can either compete or collude.  Payoffs are dependent on the 
opposing player’s strategy.  Thus for each player, there are four possible outcomes.  
Either players can compete, both players can collude, or one player can compete while 
the other colludes.  Of course, payoffs differ under each of the four possible strategy 
combinations. The game can be depicted in the following matrix, known as the normal 
form representation of the game. 
 
 
Player 2’s Strategies 
Player 1’s 
Strategies 
  Compete  Collude 
Compete  5,5  10,-2 
Collude  -2,10  8,8 
    
Following convention, the first number in each cell represents player one’s payoff, while 
the second number represents player two’s payoffs.  So for example if player one 
competes while player two colludes, player one receives a payoff of –2, while player two 
receives a payoff of 10.   
 
This game has a single equilibrium when using Nash equilibrium as the solution concept. 
A Nash equilibrium can loosely be defined as the best strategy for each player in 
response to all other players’ possible strategies.  In this game, each player’s best strategy 
and therefore the Nash equilibrium of the game is to compete.  To see this, imagine that 
each player is currently playing collude.  This is not a stable outcome because player one 
knows that cheating on the collusive agreement and instead playing compete nets her 10.  
By cooperating and colluding she would net only 8.  The increased profits create an 
incentive for player one to cheat.  Player two recognizes this and also sees that he has the 
same incentive to cheat.  Thus, the optimal strategy is for each player to compete, which 
nets each player 5. 
 
This game is designed to mimic the decisions firms have when establishing a cartel.  By 
coordinating their activities each firm can increase their profits above those that can be 
had by competing vigorously.  Firms recognize their interdependence and charge a higher 
price raising profits for each firm.  However, each firm has an incentive to cheat on the 
cartel agreement.  Each firm has an incentive to decrease price slightly in an attempt to 
gain market share.  However, if this occurs the cartel breaks down and firms end up   3 
charging the competitive price.  This is the Nash equilibrium outcome described in the 
paragraph above.  
 
This model would seem to rule out the possibility for cartel arrangements in even highly 
concentrated markets.  After all, the optimal strategy is for firms to compete.  However, 
extensions to this basic model have shown that strategies exist that support the collusive 
outcome.  One such model suggests that if the game is seen as an infinitely repeated 
game, with players adopting a trigger strategy, a collusive equilibrium is possible.  The 
trigger strategy dictates that if a player observed an opposing player cheating in the 
previous period, then that player reciprocates by cheating in all future periods.  That is, if 
player one observes player two cheating, then player one also cheats in all subsequent 
periods.  Given this setup, the optimal choice for all players is to collude.  From Koontz 
et al (1993), the collusive equilibrium is supported as long as the following conditions are 
true: 
 
(1)    Vi(p’) > Vi(p
’’) for all firms 




Vi(st) represents the discounted expected profits for firm i, from following strategy st.  
Strategies, st, include colluding and paying a collusive price (p
’), cheating and paying a 
competitive price when all others are colluding, p




Equation (1) indicates that the discounted expected profits from colluding exceed the 
expected discounted profits from competing, for all firms.  Equation (2) indicates the 
trigger strategy portion of the game. A player observed cheating and paying price p* in 
any period triggers a response in all other players. All players respond to the cheater by 
following suit and paying the competitive price, p’’ , in all subsequent periods.  Equation 
(2) indicates that the expected discounted profits from colluding exceed the discounted 
expected profits from cheating in one period when added to the expected discounted 
profits from all firms subsequently competing.  Note that in the event a player is observed 
cheating, the game reverts to the same equilibrium as the one shot Nash equilibrium in 
the prisoner’s dilemma game. 
 
In contrast to the one shot prisoner’s dilemma, the trigger strategy game establishes that 
collusive outcomes are possible.  Koontz et al. (1993) test for evidence that firms in the 
cattle industry followed the trigger strategy game.  Their results suggest that in the past 
firms have exhibited collusive behavior. 
 
While the theoretical model shows that collusive outcomes are feasible, practical 
considerations make that outcome less than certain.  Not only must firms find mutually 
agreeable prices, but they must also achieve those prices and maintain them.  An industry 
populated by similar firms may make agreeable prices easier to find, but changing market 
dynamics may make those prices difficult to attain and maintain.  Recall one of the 
features of the trigger strategy game is the ability to detect cheating on cartel prices.  In 
the face of changing supply and demand conditions, identifying whether a price change is   4 
cheating on a cartel or is merely responding to changing market conditions may not be 
straightforward.  Uncertainty about being detected as a cheater increases the likelihood of 
cheating, making the collusive outcome less stable.  It is also important to note that the 
incentive to cheat arises from the desire to increase profits by cheating; the cartel price is 
different that the marginal value of the good under consideration.  If this incentive is 
mitigated, the likelihood of cheating is also decreased.  It is these two insights that give 
rise to a body of research that examines industry practices that can act to facilitate 
cooperative outcomes.  In this research, practices that either increase the likelihood of 
being detected as a cheater, or that decrease the profit incentive to cheat are examined as 
practices that may increase the likelihood of a successful tacit cartel.  In some cases this 
research is used to hypothesize how vertical arrangements or other industry practices can 
have consequences for horizontal coordination.  In other words, vertical coordination 
may have horizontal consequences. 
 
Practices that Facilitate Cartel Cooperation and Dampen Competition 
 
As mentioned, practices that increase the certainty of being identified as a cheater, or that 
act to mitigate the profit incentive to cheat on a cartel arrangement, may be seen as 
practices that facilitate oligopsony coordination.  These facilitating practices can have 
two types of effects.  They can assist information exchange and/or manage incentives.  
Information exchange helps detect changes in rival behaviors, thus decreasing the lag 
between cheating and being detected as a cheater.  The faster a cheater is identified, the 
shorter the period of time the cheater benefits from cheating.  The shorter the period of 
benefit, the less incentive to cheat, and the more stable the collusive equilibrium.  In 
contrast, incentive management directly mitigates the profit from cheating.  Certain 
institutional features build in automatic penalties to cheating.  Note that both directly or 
indirectly affect the incentive to cheat. The incentive to cheat is the basis for instability in 
cartels, and if this incentive to cheat is mitigated cartel arrangements become more stable, 
and thus more likely to occur and endure. 
 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and to a lesser extent the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) have used this theory to examine the anti-competitive effects of business practices 
in several industries.  They examine the implications of several different practices, some 
of which may be analogous to practices occurring in the fed cattle market.  Below, I 
briefly outline the theory behind several practices and attempt to draw parallels with 
practices in the fed cattle market.   
 
The FTC is frequently concerned with supply contracts that contain “most-favored-
nation” (MFN) clauses.  In these contracts, a buyer and seller engage in either formal or 
informal agreements that guarantee a buyer the best price offered to any other buyer.  
These agreements can take two forms, either retroactive or contemporary.  In a 
retroactive MFN, price guarantees take the form of rebates.  Today’s transaction price is 
the worst case scenario for a buyer.  If in the future, for the duration of the contract, a 
lower price is offered to any other buyer, then all buyers with MFNs must also receive 
the lower price.  For the retroactive case, buyers will be paid a rebate equal to the price   5 
difference times the number of units sold.  For the contemporary case, all buyers with 
MFN’s are guaranteed the best price offered to any other buyer. 
 
The competitive implications for MFN contracts arise from two separate, but similar, 
theories.  The first envisions a MFN clause as a practice that supports horizontal 
coordination in a trigger strategy game. That is, firms with these policies may be able to 
avoid a prisoner’s dilemma.  The second envisions MFN clauses as mechanisms that can 
dampen competition.   
 
In the case of the retroactive MFN, the contract directly affects the payoffs from lowering 
price in the future.  Referring back to the trigger strategy game above, the retroactive 
MFN directly affects the payoff (i(p
*)) from cheating on the collusive strategy.  The 
profit from cheating gained by lowering price and gaining market share is decreased by 
the amount of profit lost from rebating the price decrease to previous buyers.  In this way, 
the contract provision can aid to stabilize the collusive outcome.   
 
Contemporary MFNs are very similar to best price policies (also called meet or release 
clauses).  A seller offering contemporary MFN guarantees to match any lower price 
offered by the firm to any other buyer.  A seller with a best price guarantee offers to 
match any lower price offered to buyers by any of the seller’s competitors.  In these 
arrangements, sellers guarantee buyers that if any other seller offers a lower price, then 
they will match that lower price.  Both policies have the potential to allow firms to avoid 
the prisoner’s dilemma. 
 
When a seller commits to a contemporary MFN contract, she limits her ability to offer 
limited discounts.  In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the temptation to cheat is gained 
through the prospect of gaining customers through lower prices.  However, with 
contemporary MFN clauses that temptation is lessened because the lower prices offered 
to the new customers would have to be offered to all customers guaranteed the price 
match.  Therefore, the incentive to cheat is mitigated.  The prospect of prices maintained 
near monopoly levels increases.   
 
When a MFN contract is offered in conjunction with a best price policy, the prospect of 
oligopoly coordination increases further.  A provider of a contemporary MFN contract 
commits to being less aggressive as mentioned in the paragraph above.  Rival may see 
this as an advantage in the market place.  Knowing that the provider of the MFN contract 
will not match price decreases, these decreases become more profitable, and thus more 
likely to occur.  However, by committing to match any price decreases with a best price 
policy, the provider eliminates the rival’s advantage.   
 
This theory is articulated by Jonathan B. Baker, former Director of the FTC’s Bureau of 
Economics, in a policy speech given in 1996.  According to Baker, these arrangements 
have the potential to dampen competition (Baker, 1996).  A firm that engages in a MFN 
agreement commits to being less aggressive.  Once this is known, rivals may also become 
less aggressive. Once it is known that a firm cannot aggressively pursue additional 
customers, rivals are likely to react knowing that they also can be less aggressive.  Under   6 
these circumstances, it becomes likely that it becomes profitable to offer MFN clauses.  
Firms engage in a strategy to evoke a less aggressive strategy from a competitor. 
 
Drawing Parallels to the Fed Cattle Industry 
 
Some practices in the fed cattle market have the same potential to facilitate oligopsonistic 
coordination and dampen competition as do MFN clauses and best price policies.  While 
the theory may apply to other marketing or procurement practices, I focus on one 
particular practice in this paper.  Note that because I examine the procurement of inputs 
in a market where buyers possess the prospect for market power, in contrast to traditional 
treatments, the description of price increases and decreases is altered.  Now because 
buyers are the decision-makers, cartel prices are lower than competitive prices.  In the 
prisoner’s dilemma game, excess profits are gained when low cartel prices are 
maintained.  Cheating is accomplished by increasing prices in an attempt to steal 
customers from rivals.  The model is equally applicable with only inconsequential 
changes in price movements.   
 
Feedlots and packers often agree to market cattle using what is commonly referred to as 
top of the market pricing (TOMP).  In this practice a feedlot and packer agree that a pen 
or pens of cattle will be sold to the packer at the top price in a market for that week.  The 
cattle are committed before the market price is established and once the market top price 
is established the cattle trade at that price.  This agreement is equivalent to a market-wide 
contemporary MFN clause with a best price policy.  The packer is agreeing to pay the 
highest price that packer pays any feedlot.  The packer has given that feedlot most 
favored customer status.  The packer is also agreeing to match the highest price paid by 
any other packer in the region.  This is the price match clause offered in best price 
policies.  Because TOMP contains the same elements as a contemporary MFN clause 
with a best price policy attached, TOMP should raise the same anti-competitive concerns, 
as do these policies. 
 
With TOMP, the packer is agreeing to match any competitor’s price.  This practice has 
the potential to facilitate coordination among packers and to dampen competition. 
Because the agreement is struck before the price is established, packers have an incentive 
to act strategically and keep the top price low.  First, the packer engaging in the practice 
has now created a self-imposed penalty to increasing bids in the market. In terms of the 
trigger strategy game the profit incentive to cheat is mitigated.  The packer with TOMP, 
while perhaps recognizing a profit incentive to increase bids in feedlots in which he does 
not have TOMP agreements in order to acquire more cattle, now must recognize the 
consequences from doing so.  Because cattle trade in a very narrow range, with a 
majority trading at a single price, any packer increasing prices poses the real specter of 
setting the market top.  Certainly, any packer offering TOMP has an incentive not to 
aggressively pursue cattle by increasing bids and pushing the market higher.  The TOMP 
cattle already committed change the packers incentives and make it more likely that they 
chose not to act aggressively and instead tacitly cooperate with their competitors at a 
lower price. Furthermore, the packer is now insulated from the actions of rivals.  There is 
no way rivals can acquire the TOMP cattle by out bidding the first packer.  Given this,   7 
rivals would certainly become less aggressive pursuing cattle committed under TOMP.  
Rivals would also recognize the packers with TOMP agreements in place would be less 
aggressive in the market, allowing them also to become less aggressive.  This is the 
dampening competition effect described by Baker with discussing most favored nation 




While the intuition of the theory above is sound, it is far from rigorous.  It suggests that 
top of the market pricing has the potential to dampen competition and facilitate 
coordination among competitors.  Whether or not it does is not established.  The 
usefulness of economic theory is often measured by its ability to suggest testable 
hypothesis.  However, in this case the hypotheses that arise from this theory would be 
difficult to empirically test.  Presumably, any empirical examination would be dependent 
on data measuring the volume of cattle sold using top of the market pricing.  These data 
would likely be difficult to acquire.  Most packers record top of the market transactions 
as cash transactions.  This makes it impossible to identify these transactions in packers’ 
records.  Conversations with packers also suggest they are unlikely to identify which 
transactions used top of the market pricing.  In our questions about these types of 
transactions, one packer was evasive and questioned whether any transactions could be 
termed top of the market.  Feedlots are equally unlikely to identify themselves as using 
this method.  The benefit to feedlots from using this practice is to be able to report to 
their customers that they received the top market price for their cattle and that the cattle 
were sold in a timely manner.  It is unlikely they would be willing to identify themselves 
as an idle price taker, rather than an aggressive market maker.   
 
Lacking data, the likelihood that a theory is appropriately applied to a market can be 
judged by how well the characteristics of the market match the theory.  For MFNs, the 
anti-competitive consequences are more likely to occur in markets with few firms, with a 
low likelihood of new entry, and with predictable demand and supply shifts.  The fed 
cattle market is highly concentrated, with four firms purchasing over 80 percent of the 
fed cattle in the U.S.  While not insurmountable, new entry would be difficult.  Many 
studies show the industry is characterized by large economies of scale, suggesting a large 
plant is necessary to compete with established firms.  The capital requirements to enter 
the industry at such a large scale are likely considerable.  It may be the case that cartel 
arrangements result in prices just high enough to prevent new entry.  That is, given the 
large capital requirements and the large risk associated with a large-scale investment, 
prices may persist below marginal revenue product, but high enough to prevent entry.  
Third, very short run price fluctuations seem to be fairly predictable.  Packers have 
extensive knowledge of market ready supply through their salaried buyers that weekly 
visit every feedlot and view the cattle ready and nearly ready for market.  In contrast, 
demand in the market seems to be fairly stable or predictable.   
 
It is also important to investigate why feedlots enter into these agreements.  It is likely 
these agreements result from feedlots’ desire to sell cattle in a timely manner at the 
market price.  A prospect that has grown increasingly difficult in times of oversupply and   8 
as marketing options as measured by the number of available packers declines.  Given 
this, TOMP creates the possibility that efficiencies are gained by increasing the frequency 
of timely marketing.  Furthermore, customers receive the top market price for their cattle.  
Again, a consideration afforded customers when TOMP provisions are available.  Of 
course, the highest price argument is questionable if, as theorized, the high market price 
is not the result of a competitive market.   
 
The theory outlined above represents a rough sketch to examine practices that facilitate 
oligopsony coordination.  Given the prospect for anti-competitive effects, it may be 
appropriate for this agency to pursue regulatory action.  The reason to focus on this 
practice is three fold.  First, the practice is similar to MFN clauses that other regulatory 
agencies have attempted to regulate and which academics have examined (Grether and 
Plott, 1984).  These provide a useful framework to formulate and justify regulatory 
action.  Second, the practice seems intuitively anti-competitive.  It is difficult to 
formulate practical business reasons for packers to use this practice.  The agency could 
conceivably contend the only reason the practice is utilized is to lower price.  Finally, 
regulatory action would likely correct a market failure.  Thus, regulatory action has the 
potential to improve the working of the overall market and increase societal welfare and 
not simply realign welfare among market participants.  
 
Finally, this paper suggests how a particular vertical arrangement, TOMP, can have 
horizontal anti-competitive effects.  However, this theory is also applicable to other 
vertical arrangements in use in the fed cattle market.  Note especially, how it changes the 
theoretical backdrop for examining captive supplies.  Until now, a negative correlation 
between prices and captive supplies was theorized to result from a reduction in bidding 
aggressiveness on behalf of packers.  The theory above suggests why packers might bid 
less aggressively when captive supplies are high.  Furthermore, it eliminates debates over 
the appropriate time span over which to define captive supplies and whether feedlots or 
packers control delivery.  Delivery control and delivery timing matter in the theory above 
only in the respect that packers must know cattle are committed prior to price being 
determined.  In short, this theory represents a dramatically new way to examine the 
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